PCF IPsec Add-On v1.6

Release Notes

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This topic contains release notes for the IPsec Add-on for PCF.


Release Date: August 22, 2017

Note: If you have conflicts with the RabbitMQ HAProxy, check the Knowledgebase at

  • Fixes a certificate validation issue on Linux VMs - Validate instance certificate is signed by one of the CA certificates


Release Date: August 1, 2017

Note: If you have conflicts with the RabbitMQ HAProxy, check the Knowledgebase at

  • Fixes the Optional flag for applying IPsec to an existing cluster
  • Fixes log folder and files permissions (no impact to users)


Release Date: July 28, 2017

Note: If you have conflicts with the RabbitMQ HAProxy, check the Knowledgebase at

  • Restores syslog for logging
  • IPsec log location is now configurable (default is syslog)
  • Uses bosh stop instead of bosh drain


Release Date: June 26, 2017

Note: This release does NOT write to Syslog; if you require Syslog, wait for the next patch release.

  • Interim patch to avoid RabbitMQ Syslog timing conflict. If you don’t have this timing conflict, you can ignore this patch.
  • Update Strongswan to 5.5.3, fix USN-3301-1.
  • Update golang to 1.8.1
  • Update openssl to 1.0.2k
  • Update openssl-fips to 2.0.14.
  • Update gmp to 6.1.2.


Release Date: March 10, 2017

  • Supports Azure (for Linux VMs).
  • Enables configuration of IKE and ESP proposals.
  • Reduces downtime when applying IPsec to existing deployment through optional flag.
  • Updates “xfrm_acq_expires” from 165 secs (default) to 6 secs to speed up retries.
  • Fixes the ordering of IPsec and no-IPsec subnets.
  • Uses aes128-sha256-modp2048! as the default IKE proposal.

Known Issues

  • Spurious Configuration Warning: As part of the upgrade to StrongSwan version 5.4.0, this version of the IPsec add-on will emit a sequence of spurious configuration warning messages. The messages will appear similar to the following:

    !! Your strongswan.conf contains manual plugin load options for charon.
    !! This is recommended for experts only, see

    These messages are both expected, and harmless. As a caution to end users, the StrongSwan software now emits a warning message when it detects that the installation includes a manually configured set of plug-ins. As a matter of security hygiene best practices, the IPsec add-on has always used a manual (explicit) configuration, and loads a restricted set of StrongSwan plug-ins. Any unused plug-ins are not loaded. The newest version of StrongSwan now issues this warning message when it detects that situation. The actual list of plug-ins in use has been determined to be appropriate for use of StrongSwan in the PCF environment. This warning is expected, and should be ignored.

  • Certificate Verification: There is a known issue with the CA certificate validation. The IPsec add-on supports credential rotation with minimal downtime. The host instance certificate can be rotated at any time by doing a deployment. In addition, the CA certificate that is used to verify trust in the host certificates can be rotated with minimal downtime by doing multiple deployments.

    However, because all VMs typically share the same instance certificate, they will trust each other without relying upon the CA certificate. The CA certificate is not actually needed until the operator does a deployment to rotate the instance certificate(s). While that deployment is running, some of the VMs will have received a new instance certificate, while other VMs are still operating using the prior instance certificate. During this time, while the instance certificates are different, the validation of the peer instance certificate will rely upon the common CA certificate in order to establish trust in the counterparty.

    If the CA certificate is malformed, or otherwise invalid, this problem will remain latent until the time when the instance certificate is being rotated. It is only during that deployment when the operator will discover that the CA certificate is not valid. Of course, as long as the CA certificate is valid, there is no problem.

    It is recommended that operators use a tool such as OpenSSL to verify that the CA certificate they are choosing to configure is in fact valid, and contains the appropriate details for proper end-entity authentication of the VM in the deployment (such as subjectName, issuerName, and validity dates, etc).

    Operators can use their favorite certificate management tool to confirm that their certificate matches what they expect. Using OpenSSL, one can issue the command:

    $ openssl x509 -in myCA.crt -text
    If this command produces valid output, then the certificate will be OK when configured for IPsec.

  • MTU Sizing: Use 1354 on OpenStack. Keep the default on AWS and vSphere.

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